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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 1
The National Association for Public Defense
(“NAPD”) is an association of more than 14,000
attorneys,
investigators,
social
workers,
administrators, and other professionals who fulfill
constitutional mandates to deliver public defense
representation throughout all U.S. states and
territories. NAPD members advocate for clients in
jails, courtrooms, and communities, and are experts
in the theory and practice of effective defense to
people who are charged with crimes but who cannot
afford to hire counsel. They work in federal, state,
county, and municipal jurisdictions as full-time,
contract, and assigned counsel, litigating juvenile,
capital, and appellate cases through a diversity of
traditional and holistic practice models.
NAPD plays an important role in advocating for
defense counsel and the clients they serve, and is
uniquely situated to speak to issues of fairness and
justice in criminal legal systems. The critical
importance of the jury’s role in checking government
power has only increased in the context of
contemporary mass incarceration—a phenomenon
widely criticized by sentencing experts. See, e.g.,
Vivien Stern, The International Impact of U.S.
No counsel for a party authored this amicus curiae brief in
whole or in part, and no such counsel or party made a monetary
contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of
this brief. By letters dated October 27, 2016, amicus notified
counsel of record for both parties in this case of the intent to file
this amicus brief, and both parties have consented to the filing
of this brief.
1

-2Policies, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENTS 279–80 (Marc
Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind, eds. 2002). Members of
the federal judiciary—including a Member of this
Court—have
acknowledged
resulting
harms.
Associated Press, Justice Criticizes Lengthy Sentences,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Aug.
10,
2003,
www.nytimes.com/2003/08/10/us/justice-criticizeslengthy-sentences.html (“Our resources are misspent,
our punishments too severe, our sentences too
long … .”) (quoting Justice Kennedy’s address to the
2003 annual meeting of the American Bar
Association).
The
effects
of
mass
incarceration
fall
disproportionately on low-income communities and
communities of color, and those effects include the
deepening of a democracy deficit in which these
communities exercise relatively little voice in
generating and administering the governing law. J.
TRAVIS, ET AL., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE
GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 303 (2014). In
light of these factors, a robust right to jury trial has
heightened importance as a critical bulwark against
the exercise of concentrated government power and
its disproportionate effects in already disadvantaged
communities. See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE
OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 141–42 (2011). As
this case presents important and unresolved
questions about the jury’s role and the protections the
jury offers to the rights of individual criminal
defendants as well as to society at large, NAPD
respectfully offers its perspective to the Court.

-3SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The jury is essential to our structure of
government, available to criminal defendants as the
final arbiter of guilt. As this Court has recognized
time and again, the jury serves an important role
both structurally within the balance of powers and as
a check on governmental power, adding a layer of
protection for individual defendants.
The rule applied by the Ninth Circuit and some
other courts, allowing dismissal of a holdout juror if a
judge sees no reasonable possibility that his view is
connected to the merits of the case, threatens the
fundamental role of the jury. In contrast to the rule
endorsed by federal courts of appeals that prohibit
dismissal if there is any possibility a juror’s view is
connected to the merits, the Ninth Circuit’s rule
makes dismissal of jurors easier, resulting in more
frequent removal of dissenting viewpoints. Equally
threatening to the jury is the practical reality of the
Ninth Circuit’s approach, which forces judges to
invade jury deliberations in order to assess the
reasonableness of a juror’s views.
The rule applied below risks minimizing the role
of the jury in the criminal system and forces judges to
undertake
intrusive
assessments
of
the
reasonableness of individual juror’s views. This Court
should grant certiorari and clarify the standard
under which a dissenting juror can be investigated
and ultimately dismissed.

-4ARGUMENT
A. The Role of the Jury Is Fundamental in Our
National Justice System.
The jury performs a role essential to the balance
of powers and protection of individual rights in our
system of government. The jury right has long been
recognized as a key guarantor of protection against
government overreach, a systematic and structural
defense for the individual. “This right was designed
to guard against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on
the part of rulers, and was from very early times
insisted on by our ancestors in the parent country, as
the great bulwark of their civil and political liberties.”
United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510–11 (1995)
(internal quotations omitted).
This Court has recognized the essential role the
jury plays in the functioning of the federal
constitutional system: The jury trial right “is no mere
procedural formality, but a fundamental reservation
of power in our constitutional structure. Just as
suffrage ensures the people’s ultimate control in the
legislative and executive branches, jury trial is meant
to ensure their control in the judiciary.” Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305–06 (2004) (citation
omitted).
As this Court has observed, the history of the
right shows the Founders’ concern about protecting a
criminal defendant against potentially arbitrary
judicial action:
A right to jury trial is granted to criminal
defendants in order to prevent oppression by
the Government. Those who wrote our
constitutions
knew
from
history
and

-5experience that it was necessary to protect
against unfounded criminal charges brought to
eliminate enemies and against judges too
responsive to the voice of higher authority.
The framers of the constitutions strove to
create an independent judiciary but insisted
upon further protection against arbitrary
action. Providing an accused with the right to
be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an
inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or
overzealous prosecutor and against the
compliant, biased, or eccentric judge. If the
defendant
preferred
the
common-sense
judgment of a jury to the more tutored but
perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single
judge, he was to have it. Beyond this, the jury
trial provisions in the Federal and State
Constitutions reflect a fundamental decision
about the exercise of official power—a
reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the
life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to
a group of judges. Fear of unchecked power, so
typical of our State and Federal Governments
in other respects, found expression in the
criminal law in this insistence upon
community participation in the determination
of guilt or innocence.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155–56 (1968).
The importance of the jury right, coupled with the
unanimity requirement in the federal system and the
vast majority of states, makes each jury member’s
perspective relevant and each and every juror of
equal importance in the outcome. “The dynamics of
the jury process are such that often only one or two

-6members express doubt as to view held by a majority
at the outset of deliberations. A rule which insists on
unanimity furthers the deliberative process by
requiring the minority view to be examined and, if
possible, accepted or rejected by the entire jury.”
United States v. Lopez, 581 F.2d 1338, 1341 (9th Cir.
1978) (Kennedy, J.).
B. The Decision Below Undermines the
Functioning of the Essential Institution of
the Jury.
Any rule of law that threatens the jury’s role by
minimizing or demanding justification from
dissenting viewpoints demands scrutiny and should
require strong justification. The rule applied by
courts that allow dismissal of a dissenting juror
absent a “reasonable possibility” that his view is
connected to the merits of the case encourages
interference with the jury’s role and weakens the
jury’s status as a safeguard for criminal defendants,
with no corresponding benefit.
1.

The Holdout Juror Serves an
Important Role for the Legitimacy
and Reliability of the Jury System.

The dissenting juror serves as an important check
preserving the rights of a criminal defendant,
especially in the federal system and the many state
systems where a jury must be unanimous. The juror
who dissents even in the face of the social pressure of
a jury panel that is otherwise in agreement offers a
different viewpoint that adds to both the quality of
the deliberation that culminates in the ultimate
verdict and, studies suggest, the accuracy of the

-7verdict itself. This important role thus safeguards not
only the individual criminal defendant’s rights, but
the jury system and its place in society as well.
In the unanimous jury system, the vote of each
juror is determinative, and thus even one juror can
exercise the role envisioned by the Framers, serving
as a check on overzealous prosecution or insufficient
evidence. Nor is there any reason to think that the
holdout juror must necessarily be eccentric, incorrect,
or unthinking. A holdout juror must maintain his
view in the face of unanimous disagreement from the
rest of the panel, often over a significant length of
time. Indeed, one study concluded that the views of
holdouts are far from eccentric; the trial judge often
sided with dissenting jurors in non-unanimous
verdicts. Shari Seidman Diamond, Mary R. Rose, &
Beth Murphy, Revisiting the Unanimity Requirement:
The Behavior of the Non-Unanimous Civil Jury, 100
NW. U. L. REV. 201, 221–22 (2006).
A juror who takes a different view from the
majority of the panel strengthens the deliberative
process that results in the jury’s ultimate verdict. As
one study found, jurors “report[ed] more thorough
and open-minded debate” when forced to reach
unanimity and thus interact with any dissenting
jurors. Diamond, Rose & Murphy, supra, at 230. As
this Court long ago observed, “[t]he very object of the
jury system is to secure unanimity by a comparison of
views, and by arguments among the jurors
themselves.” Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501
(1896). Where a holdout juror remains in
deliberations, the jury is forced to confront the
opposing viewpoint, resulting in a jury verdict that is
reached after taking account of diverse views. A rule

-8like the one below, which permits a jury to more
easily conscript a judge into removing a juror who
sees the case differently, allows juries to avoid this
thorough deliberation. See Kim Taylor-Thompson,
Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113 HARV. L. REV.
1261, 1263–64 (2000) (“Jury research conducted in
the past two decades reveals that eliminating the
obligation to secure each person’s agreement on the
verdict can result in truncating or even eliminating
jury deliberations.”). This, in turn, risks removing the
holdout juror’s ability to contribute to the function
the jury performs in the governmental system. In
Oregon, for instance, where non-unanimous verdicts
are allowed, 65.5% of verdicts on at least one count in
felony
jury
trials
were
non-unanimous,
demonstrating that juries who can ignore an opposing
viewpoint will regularly do so. See OREGON OFFICE OF
PUBLIC DEFENSE SERVICE APPELLATE DIVISION, ON
FREQUENCY OF NON-UNANIMOUS FELONY
THE
VERDICTS IN OREGON 4 (2009). By allowing minority
viewpoints to be silenced, a rule making dismissal of
a dissenting juror easier allows juries to target those
whose backgrounds or experiences may be different
from their own, and to attempt to remove those voices
from the deliberative process. Conversely, where a
jury is forced to reach a unanimous verdict, it “has a
precise effect on the fact-finding process, one which
gives particular significance and conclusiveness to
the jury’s verdict. Both the defendant and society can
place special confidence in a unanimous verdict … .”
Lopez, 581 F.2d at 1341.
Jurors express greater confidence in the accuracy
of their verdicts where all members agree. See
Diamond, Rose & Murphy, supra, at 208. A survey of
wrongful convictions in Louisiana, where some non-

-9unanimous criminal verdicts are permitted, found
that out of 20 wrongful convictions where the verdict
could be non-unanimous, 9 were the result of verdicts
reached over dissenting votes. See Br. of Innocence
Project New Orleans as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 11, Jackson v. Louisiana, No. 13-1105
(U.S. 2014).
2.

Unlike the Rule in Some Courts, the
“Reasonableness” Standard Applied
by the Ninth Circuit and Others
Forces Judges To Intrude into the
Province of the Jury.

The rule allowing dismissal of a juror where there
is “no reasonable possibility” that his view relates to
the merits of the case requires greater intrusion into
the jury’s role by the district judge, who must
examine the reasons for the complaints about the
holdout and inquire into the holdout’s reasoning.
Because of the jury’s important role as a check within
the criminal justice system, any rule encouraging this
increased intrusion on the jury role should be met
with skepticism.
Holdout jurors already face significant pressure
to conform to the views of the majority. See Dan
Simon, More Problems with Criminal Trials: The
Limited Effectiveness of Legal Mechanisms, 75 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 198–99 (2012) (surveying
empirical data demonstrating that “a distinctive
feature of jury deliberation is that unanimity is often
achieved through social pressure,” and that the
“strength of the social pressure tends to increase as
the deliberation progresses”). Such pressure can only
be magnified when it is a judge who inquires into the
rationale of the views of the holdout juror, and the
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frequency and intensity of this inquiry. The
difference between the standard allowing dismissal of
a juror where there is “no reasonable possibility” that
the view is connected to the merits, as compared to
the bar on dismissal where there is “any possibility”
that the view is connected to the merits, has a
practical effect on the judge/jury relationship.
First, the “no reasonable possibility” rule
increases the likelihood of an inquiry into a
dissenting juror’s views. Jurors in the majority can,
as they did in this case, more easily appeal to the
district judge about their disagreement. The “no
reasonable possibility” rule, designed as it is to make
juror dismissal more attainable, will lead to more
frequent inquiries by the judge, since a wider variety
of opinions and behavior by holdout jurors will
demand an inquiry into the reasonableness of a
holdout’s views and their connection to the merits.
Regardless of how the judge constructs the inquiry or
whether he dismisses the juror, the “no reasonable
possibility” rule will result in judges more often
needing to make an inquiry in the first place. Thus,
whether the holdout is dismissed or not, the very fact
of the questioning by the district judge, which will be
more frequent under the reasonableness rule,
intrudes into substantive jury deliberations by
sending (even if inadvertently) a powerful signal to
both the holdout and the other jurors about what the
result ought to be. Indeed, here, the jury decided to
convict shortly after the alternate juror was seated.
See Pet. 16.
Second, the reasonableness inquiry requires a
more substantive, and thus more intrusive,

- 11 exploration of the holdout’s reasoning by the district
judge. The judge must gather enough information to
assess whether the juror’s expressed opinions have no
reasonable possibility of relation to the merits. Here,
for instance, the standard required inquiry into the
juror’s views even after the district court
acknowledged that the juror’s reported statements
could be construed as comments on the strength of
the government’s case. As the dissenting judge below
(himself a federal district court judge) noted, “the
record makes clear that the questioned jurors’
answers to the court’s inquiries were rooted, at least
potentially, in their disagreement with Juror 7 about
his assessment of the merits of the government’s
case.” Pet. App. 133a (Christensen, C.J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Juror 7 had
commented, for instance, on the fact that a key
witness was missing from the government’s case, Pet.
App. 91a, and that it was a “joke case,” and later
confirmed that he thought the evidence insufficient
because it was circumstantial, Pet. App. 93a n.24. In
circuits that apply the “any possibility” rule, no
inquiry would have been needed: As even the district
judge here concluded, there was some possibility that
the holdout juror’s views of the case were connected
to the merits. Under the approach adopted by other
courts of appeals, that fact would have prohibited the
inquiry. Instead, as this case demonstrates, under the
“no reasonable possibility” standard, the judge is
forced into complicated interactions with jurors that
would not take place under the rule from other
courts. And that inquiry will continually risk
intrusion into substantive deliberations. The record
from the district court shows that the judge
“repeatedly had to cut [jurors] off mid-sentence”

- 12 because the inquiry inevitably led jurors to discuss
the merits of jury deliberations. See Pet. App. 96a.
Thus, the “no reasonable possibility” rule has
systemic consequences, forcing judges into intrusive
questioning that interferes in the jury’s functioning,
no matter how careful the judge is. Indeed, several
members of this Court have expressed deep unease
about a trial judge intruding into the jury’s sphere to
dismiss a holdout juror. “[T]he possibility of getting
rid of … the hold-out juror,” rather than encouraging
further deliberation, “is really troublesome.” Tr. at
18, Johnson v. Williams, No. 11-465, 133 S. Ct. 1088
(2013) (statement of Ginsburg, J.); see also id. at 21
(statement of Sotomayor, J.) (“I’m deeply troubled
when trial judges intrude in the deliberative
processes of juries.”); id. at 19 (statement of
Kennedy, J.) (“agree[ing]” that such intrusion is “very
troublesome”).
Holdout jurors play an essential role in promoting
careful deliberation and ensuring that the jury
performs its protective function of bringing the voices
of individuals into the criminal justice system. And
they provide this safeguard at little risk to the
efficiency of the system: the rate of hung juries in
federal criminal trials is quite low. See PAULA L.
HANNAFORD-AGOR, VALERIE P. HANS, NICOLE L. MOTT
& G. THOMAS MUNSTERMAN, NATIONAL CENTER FOR
STATE COURTS, ARE HUNG JURIES A PROBLEM 22
(2002). Thus, there is no danger of rampant hung
juries if holdouts are not more easily removable. The
rule applied below, making removal of holdout jurors
easier, is a solution in search of a problem. Instead,
holdout jurors should be permitted to offer their
unique perspective in the jury system where there is

- 13 any possibility that their dissenting view relates to
the merits of the case.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be
granted.
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